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CORPORATE HIERARCHY AND RACIAL

JUSTICE
THOMAS W. Joot
I. RACIAL JUSTICE AND CORPORATIONS

What can advocates for racial justice learn from the study of
corporate governance? The neoclassical economic analysis of law
purportedly seeks to maximize social welfare. Yet mainstream
corporate governance scholarship, which is dominated by
neoclassical law-and-economics, tends to confine itself to
maximizing shareholder welfare rather than social welfare
generally. Not only do large business corporations' actions affect
their shareholders, but they also have immense "external" effects
on almost every aspect of society. Many of these externalities
implicate racial issues. Most obviously, corporations employ and
pay people, and thus affect the racial distribution of wealth,
power, and prestige. Furthermore, diversity and fair treatment
in the workplace are key elements of the social construction of
race, because for many, if not most Americans, the workplace is
the site of one's most significant interactions with people of other
Outside the employment context, corporate practices
races.
influence racial disparities in such matters as health and
environmental quality.
To the extent that scholarship on law and race has focused
explicitly on the role of corporations, it has largely ignored
business structures, business practices, and the corporate law
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regime that helps determine them. Instead, it has tended to
focus on anti-discrimination laws and other forms of direct
government intervention.1 But it is unrealistic-at least for the
foreseeable future-for diversity and anti-discrimination activists
to expect the government to pursue new legal initiatives that
explicitly address racial issues in the corporate context. 2
Corporate regulation has enjoyed recent, but probably shortlived, political popularity immediately following Enron, but the
current political hostility to race-conscious remedial law shows
no signs of changing in the immediate future.
Thus, strategies for racial justice in the corporate context
should focus in the near term on understanding and using the
corporate governance regime. This regime has two conflicting
features: shareholder participation and management discretion. 3
These two features suggest two approaches to initiating
corporate change.
I will refer to the first as "democratic
1 See Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate
Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 901, 907 (2003) (stating that "if
companies monitor their employees' compliance with anti-discrimination law, they
may begin to mitigate some of the economic effects of employment discrimination").
2 See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy'"
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 736-37
(2003) (finding that "government-mandated quotas for business corporations" are an
unlikely prospect). But see Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-OxleyReform:
Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
837, 861-62 (2003) (arguing that post-Enron corporate regulators should mandate
diversity on corporate boards to improve corporate decision-making).
3 Here, I use the term "management" to refer to the directors
and executive
officers of a corporation. Orthodox corporate legal scholarship has distinguished
between directors and officers. In this view, officers have day-to-day power over the
corporation, subject to monitoring by directors, who represent the interests of
shareholders. More recently, commentators have tended to lump directors and
executive officers together, contending that directors are, in fact, more closely
aligned with executives than with shareholders. This assumption is now being
disputed in current scholarship, and distinguishing between directors and officers is
once again becoming prevalent, as boards of directors are increasingly being
analyzed as independent centers of corporate power. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 573-74 (2002) (stating that "[s]hareholders exercise virtually no
control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy"); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L. REV. 248, 251
(1999) (explaining that the power of American corporations "rests in the hands of its
directors"). For present purposes, it is unnecessary to engage in the debate over
whether officers or directors hold greater power in a corporation. Both directors and
officers determine corporate policy, and the analysis herein applies to both, whether
they constitute two classes or only one. To avoid this dispute, however, this Article
will subsequently adopt the term "hierarchs" to refer to both directors and officers.

2005]

CORPORATE HIERARCHY

It seeks to influence corporate behavior
aspirationalism."
through the mechanisms of "corporate democracy," that is,
through shareholders' legal avenues of participation in corporate
governance. In theory, shareholder participation can achieve
both "substantive" reforms, such as increasing board diversity by
voting for directors of color, and "procedural" ones, such as
reforming a corporation's internal governance rules to increase
opportunities for future shareholder participation. A second
approach, which I will call "hierarchical realism," seeks corporate
change with the understanding that notwithstanding the rhetoric
of "corporate democracy," the board of directors and the top
executive officers, not shareholders, wield the real power in a
I refer to the first approach as "aspirational"
corporation.
on an optimistic view of the democratic nature of
rests
it
because
corporate governance. The second approach is "realist" in that it
is based on a more accurate, descriptive understanding of
corporate law and management power.
Legal Realism has been criticized for its tendency to accept
present legal conditions for what they are, rather than imagining
new ones.4 Similarly, the hierarchical realist approach invites
the criticism that it accepts the hierarchical nature of corporate
5
I
governance and lacks the vision or courage to seek change.
The hierarchical nature of
accept that criticism in part.
to change in the near
unlikely
corporate governance is simply
future, and a near-term reform strategy must accept that fact.
But even assuming increased shareholder power were a
possibility, I am skeptical that it would advance the cause of
social justice, and particularly racial justice, in corporate affairs.
The existing hierarchical system, for all its faults, may actually
be superior for these purposes.
II. CORPORATION AS HIERARCHY
The democratic aspirationalist view relies on a traditional
model of American corporate governance that Henry Hansmann6
and Reinier Kraakman have termed "the standard model."
Under this view, shareholders are the "owners" of a corporation
4 See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Personificationof the Business Corporationin
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1482 (1987).
5 Id. at 1481.
6 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001).
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and corporate directors should be, and in fact are, their faithful
agents. 7 "[D]elegated management under a board structure" is a
key characteristic of the standard model.8
Hansmann and
Kraakman argue, however, that corporations should also be
"strongly accountable to shareholder interests,"9 and
are in fact,
"strongly responsive to shareholder interests." 10
But while the American corporate governance model is an
effective engine of wealth creation, debacles like Enron and
WorldCom notwithstanding, it is "responsive" to shareholders
only in a very abstract sense. That is, if we confine the definition
of "shareholder interests" to the creation of wealth, then yes,
corporate boards, and the officers they appoint, are "responsive to
shareholder interests." But boards and officers are not, and law
does not require them to be, "responsive" to shareholders in the
sense of accepting and responding to shareholders' participation
in governance.
This is true with respect to shareholders'
expression of concerns about wealth creation issues, and doubly
so with respect to their expression of concerns about social justice
issues.
The corporate code of Delaware, the leading state of
incorporation for large U.S. corporations, sums up the
hierarchical nature of corporate governance under American law:
"The business and affairs of every corporation ... shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ,11
Shareholders' primary participation in setting corporate policy is
indirect and passive-they may approve slates of director
candidates who are normally nominated by incumbent
directors. 12 At election time, the official corporate proxy (akin to
a ballot), funded with corporate dollars and mailed out under the
imprimatur of the corporation, includes only the names of the
incumbent board's nominees. Shareholders may vote for those
nominees or "withhold" their votes, but they are not presented
with options, nor may they cast a "no" vote. A corporation's
board has no obligation to list opposition candidates in the
7 Id. at 440-41 (highlighting protection of shareholder interests as an obligation
of corporate management).
8 Id. at 440.
9 Id. at 441.
10 Id. at 440.
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
12 See Joo, supra note 2, at 744-45 (providing a discussion of the election
process).

20051

CORPORATE HIERARCHY
13

official corporate proxy materials.
Active shareholder participation is largely limited to making
and voting upon proposals for director consideration. As in the
director nomination context, corporate law limits shareholders'
access to the official corporate proxy mailing. The board may
14
The securities law
refuse to place proposals on the ballot.
regime disfavors the making of such proposals unless they are
1 5 in which case management can
made in nonbinding form,
simply ignore shareholder proposals. The brief flurry of postEnron corporate reform has not increased shareholder voice in
either the election or the proposal context.16
Shareholders who directly challenge management decisions
through litigation are likely to be rebuffed by the principle of
judicial deference to management discretion, known as the
1 7 Under this rule, shareholders may
"business judgment rule."
not challenge management's business decisions unless they can
show, despite strong presumptions to the contrary, that
management did not act in good faith, on an informed basis, or in
8
That is, disagreement
the best interests of the corporation.'
about the substantive quality of a decision does not give
shareholders grounds for a cause of action. Shareholders must
allege corruption or conduct approaching recklessness in19order to
This
even state a claim challenging management actions.
principle of deference is not limited to decisions regarding
Courts have applied business
"business," narrowly defined.
judgment deference to charitable and political spending on the
decisions will
ground that management may believe such
20 Thus, corporate
indirectly advance the corporation's business.
law puts few restrictions on management power. To the extent
that shareholders exert influence over managers, it is in the
capital marketplace and not in courts or corporate elections.
13 Id. at 758.
14 Id. at 758-59.
to this rule
15 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. One possible exception
corporate
to
amendments
binding
is shareholders' power to initiate and approve
bylaws. See Joo, supra note 2, at 753.
16 See infra note 27-28 and accompanying text.
17 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278-79 (2000).
is See id. at 278-80.
19 See id. at 283.
20 See, e.g., Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320 (Ct. App.
48, 59, 61 (Del.
1975) (discussing political spending); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d
spending).
1991) (discussing charitable
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Corporate commentators of many different stripes are
coming to accept the above description and agree that
shareholders do not hold the ultimate power in a corporation;
rather, power is highly concentrated at the top of the corporate
hierarchy.21 Despite the descriptive convergence, commentators
remain divided over the normative implications of this fact.
Some scholars see the concentration of power as undesirable.
Many of these scholars agree with the normative vision of the
standard model-that directors should be agents faithful and
accountable to the shareholders who own the corporation, but
argue that in practice, they tend to enrich and empower
themselves or their senior executive cronies. 22
Other scholars, however, celebrate the fact that power
resides in hierarchs rather than in shareholders.
Stephen
Bainbridge, for example, agrees with the assumption that a
business corporation's purpose is to enrich shareholders, but
argues that shareholder-centered corporate governance is not the
best way to achieve this goal. 23 Rather, he asserts that corporate
governance successfully pursues this end through "director
primacy"-the concentration of power and discretion in
directors. 24 Unlike Bainbridge, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout
believe that constituents other than shareholders, including
employees and creditors, have equally legitimate interests in a

21 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 547-49;
Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at
251-52; Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign
Finance:
IncorporatingCorporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence,

79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 40-41 (2001).

22 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M.
Fried & David I. Walker,
ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation,
69
U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2002); Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions-Executive
Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271,
27172 (1999).
The theory that directors and executives dominate the corporation
to the
detriment of shareholders is hardly new of course, though it fell out of favor
in the
1970s and 80s. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of
the Firm:
CriticalPerspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1498-501 (1989).
Over two
centuries ago, Adam Smith warned that corporate directors could not
be trusted
with "other people's money." The modern version of this argument can be
traced to
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' 1932 book, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY, which argued that the dispersion of share ownership
in large,
publicly traded corporations made directors and officers unaccountable
to
shareholders.
23 See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 605-06.
24 Id. at 550.
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corporation. 25 But despite their sharply different view of the
corporate purpose, Blair and Stout agree with Bainbridge that
the corporate purpose is best served by concentrating power in
the board. They argue that the competing claimants cede power
to corporate26 directors and accept them as neutral "mediating
hierarchs."
III. SHAREHOLDER POWER AND RACIAL JUSTICE
Significant increases in shareholder participation are
unlikely in the foreseeable future. The immediate post-Enron
period, the best opportunity in many years for corporate
governance reform, yielded no developments in this area. The
only news of any note was a 2003 SEC rule proposal that would
have allowed large shareholders to place director nominees on27
conditions.
the corporate proxy under certain very restrictive
But by 2005, the SEC had abandoned this proposal, and the
opened by Enron appeared to have closed
reform window
28
entirely.
In any case, even if shareholders' legal power were to
increase, it would be unlikely to contribute to social justice, and
particularly racial justice, in corporate affairs. As an example,
assume the manufacturing processes of the hypothetical Tyrell
Corporation generate a large quantity of legal, but noxious,
Tyrell's facilities are all located in low-income
waste.
neighborhoods whose residents are overwhelmingly people of
color. Technology to mitigate Tyrell's waste generation exists,
but it would have a moderate negative effect on company profits.
Residents and national civil rights organizations believe the
placement of the facilities and the corporation's failure to
mitigate the waste constitutes environmental racism. Under
existing law, shareholders sympathetic to this view could make
only nonbinding proposals asking Tyrell's board of directors to
See Blair & Stout, supra note 3, at 250.
See id. at 255, 280-81.
(proposed Oct.
27 See Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784
26
.pdf.
23, 2003), availableat http:www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-486
28 See, e.g., Joseph Nocera, Donaldson: The Exit Interview, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2005 at Cl("[The shareholder-nomination proposal] died because the commissioners
Reform
disagreed on how, or whether, to carry out the idea."); Kurt Eichenwald,
whiteEffort at Businesses Feels Pressures,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at Al ("The
in
months
recent
in
cooled
has
governance
corporate
overhaul
to
hot movement
Washington and beyond....").
25

26
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implement the waste-mitigation measures.2 9 Shareholders could
withhold their votes for directors who refused to mitigate the
waste, but they would have great difficulty fielding an
alternative slate of directors.
Now assume that SEC and state-law rule changes were to
give shareholders expanded power to make binding proposals on
the corporate ballot. Residents, who have purchased a small
number of shares for this purpose, make a shareholder proposal
that would require Tyrell to invest in waste-mitigation
technology for its plants. Obviously, the value of the new
shareholder power depends on the number of votes the proposal
can attract. Some shareholders would certainly support the
initiative. But not all of them would, particularly since it
requires them to choose between profits and racial justice. 30
Indeed, it is likely that the majority of shares would not be voted
in favor of the proposal. Note that corporate voting allocates
votes per share, not per shareholder.
Thus, the largest
shareholders have the most votes, and unlike small shareholders,
they would lose significant amounts of money under the proposal.
Furthermore, as in political elections, the concerns of racial
minorities are simply unlikely to command majorities or
significant pluralities in corporate elections. Our political system
29 Another potential avenue for active shareholder
participation is through
bylaws. Many state codes give shareholders the power to propose
and enact
corporate bylaws without board approval. It is unclear,
however, whether
shareholders can use this power in ways that would conflict with
the fundamental
rule that the board of directors shall manage a corporation. See, e.g.,
GEVURTZ, supra
note 17, at 198; Joo, supra note 2, at 755. In the hypothetical, a shareholder-adopted
bylaw requiring Tyrell management to implement waste-mitigation
measures would
obviously raise such a conflict.
30 For the sake of the hypothetical, assume
that there is a clear short-term
negative effect on profits and no clear long-term positive effect.
Some advocates of
the resolution might argue that despite the immediate harm
to profits, waste
mitigation is good for long-term profits because it will generate
public relations
value and avoid future problems with regulators. Such arguments
are easy to make;
they are speculative and difficult, if not impossible, to prove, however.
Cf. Thomas
W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Shareholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 351, 360
(2004) (contending that the argument for racial diversity in
corporate America
should not be based on its contribution to the bottom line, because
diversity may
increase profitability in some, but not all, contexts). But see Donald
C. Langevoort,
Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease,
Grit, and the
Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1615, 1643 (2004)
(arguing that profit-based rationales are a potentially effective
way of garnering
support for diversity policies, "whether or not the empirical reality
clearly supports
the inference").
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depends heavily on the anti-majoritarian judiciary, rather than
on majority rule, to decide questions of minority racial rights.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that racial minorities,
and especially economically disadvantaged racial minorities, are
underrepresented in the ranks of shareholders.
Furthermore, even if a majority of shareholders valued racial
justice highly enough to favor the Tyrell resolution, collective
from
action problems and ration'al apathy could prevent them
at all
acting. Most individual shareholders will probably not vote
difference.
a
make
to
because their votes are unlikely
Shareholder apathy toward participation in corporate governance
this
is a common, and entirely rational, response to
Shareholders who strongly object to Tyrell's
powerlessness.
than
practices are likely to simply sell their shares rather
shareholders
those
attempt to change company policy. Indeed,
to
who value racial justice very highly would be more rational
seek it through means other than the corporate governance
system.
If avenues for communication among shareholders were
it
improved along with shareholder decision-making power,
voting
might become possible to unite shareholders into large
blocs, thereby mitigating the apathy caused by dispersion. Even
if such a possibility existed, however, most shareholders would
still be unlikely to devote the necessary time to become informed,
they
much less take action. Most shareholders are diversified:
that
have multiple investments and non-investment concerns
to
likely
thus
are
Shareholders
demand their time and attention.
corporation.
one
lack the time to devote to any one issue in any
Shareholders' lack of control further discourages them from
pursuing reform by insulating them from the immediate legal
lack of
consequences of corporate social irresponsibility. Their
the
from
them
shields
participation in corporate decision making
limited
Their
threat of legal liability for corporate conduct.
economic
liability as shareholders largely shields them from the
if their
especially
culpability,
consequences of the corporation's
holdings are small and/or diversified.
of
Einer Elhauge has pointed out that shareholders' lack
as
participation and control shields them from nonlegal sanctions
as
well. 3 ' Society will not view an individual passive shareholder
31

N.Y.U.
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
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responsible for a corporation's policy. Moreover, the less power a
shareholder has to change corporate policy, the less likely he will
feel guilt for passively owning shares of a corporation with
objectionable policies.
Diversification
exacerbates
shareholder
apathy
and
insulation. 32 The more corporations a person owns shares of, the
less time she has to inform herself, or even care, about the
conduct and policies of any one of them, and the less she, her
neighbors, or society at large will view her as a morally
accountable "owner" of any one of those corporations. Many
diversified investors own shares indirectly through mutual funds
or other institutions. They are really investors in the funds, not
the corporations, adding an additional layer of insulation
between themselves and corporate conduct. Such a shareholder
likely will not even know the names of all the corporations in
which her money is invested, much less the nature of their
policies with respect to race or any other issue. Furthermore, she
does not even hold the power to vote the shares-the fund does.
As large shareholders, these mutual funds and other
institutional investors may have less reason to be apathetic. But
note that they are by nature highly diversified. Furthermore, as
profit-making organizations, they will tend to be more concerned
with profits and governance practices than with social justice
issues. Fund managers are not a particularly diverse lot. Nor
are they subject to legal or nonlegal pressure, because society
does not appear to hold institutional investors any more
accountable than it does individual shareholders33
IV.

CORPORATE HIERARCHY TO THE RESCUE?

Thus there is no reason to believe that shareholder
"democracy," in its current form or in a hypothetical stronger
form, will protect the interests of people of color or of any other
disempowered minority groups. Perhaps surprisingly, the boarddominated hierarchy may offer a better alternative than
L. REV. 733, 749-55 (2005).
32 Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and
Diversity on CorporateBoards
of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1371 (2002).
33 Some funds market themselves as "socially responsible"
funds. However, the
special name for these funds shows that demand for them is limited.
"Socially
responsible investing" is a niche product; it is not a general expectation
of investors.
Investors do not appear to punish the vast majority of funds that place
no emphasis
on "responsible" investment.
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shareholder democracy. I do not mean to suggest that managers
are inherently more enlightened or altruistic than the unwashed
masses of shareholders. They are probably even less diverse
than the shareholder class, and thus less likely to empathize
3 4 Further, they have only
with the concerns of people of color.
very limited legal accountability to shareholders, society, or
anyone else. 35 Unlike shareholders, however, top corporate
hierarchs have at least a modicum of legal accountability for a
corporation's effect on society.
Unlike shareholders, directors and officers can be implicated
in lawsuits that arise from corporate policy. Cheryl Wade has
argued, for example, that a failure to implement compliance
systems may constitute a breach of directors' duty of care and
duty to monitor because racial discrimination is illegal and
Boards may nonetheless fail to invest
potentially costly. 36
preventing and investigating workplace
to
sufficient resources
discrimination because majority white boards lack empathy for
people of color. Wade argues that legal sanctions, such as
suits, may
adverse judgments in duty of care or 3discrimination
7
wake up a board to its lack of empathy.
As noted above, adverse judgments against corporate
hierarchs are highly unlikely in the absence of corrupt or reckless
conduct. 38 But even if not found liable, indeed even if not named
personally, directors will be directly inconvenienced by legal
action against the corporation. In addition to the cost and
annoyance of becoming enmeshed in legal proceedings, negative
individual or corporate publicity can harm the personal and
professional reputations of directors. Even if these direct and
L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social
34 See Cheryl
REV. 1461, 1481
Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L.
(2002).
35 See Joo, supra note 30, at 360, 362.
36 Wade, supra note 34, at 1466, 1481.
cross-racial
37 Wade believes it is unrealistic to expect boards to develop true
realize
may
they
however,
empathy,
of
lack
their
recognize
empathy. If directors

oversight that
that it is preventing them from taking discrimination seriously, an
Id.
terms.
line
bottom
can be costly in
personal liability
38 Statutes allowing full or partial exculpation of directors for
undermine
further
insurance,
and
indemnification
as
well
as
for carelessness,
settlements
directors' personal monetary liability. The recent Enron and WorldCom
precisely
involving personal monetary contributions by directors were notable
Neil A.
and
Jossen
J.
Robert
See
because such personal contributions are so rare.
L.J.,
N.Y.
Directors,
Outside
of
Liability
Personal
At
Look
Close
a
Steiner, Taking
settlements).
August 22, 2005, at 8 (describing
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collateral effects on directors are limited, shareholders
experience virtually no such effects.
Corporate hierarchs, as the public personas of corporations,
are also the individuals responsible for publicly justifying the
immense power of the corporation in society. As corporate power
grew to rival government power during the twentieth century,
society began to demand that corporate power have greater
moral legitimacy than the mere pursuit of profit. 39 Neil Mitchell
has argued that corporations-or more specifically, their
hierarchs-have thus felt pressure to use corporate wealth and
power for the good of society generally in order to justify and
maintain corporate power. 40 Robert W. Lundeen, chairman of
Dow Corporation, explained his concern for corporate social
responsibility as follows: "We found that if we were perceived as
not running our business in the public interest, the public
[would] get back at us with restrictive regulations and laws."41
Since the 1980s, "shareholder value" has been a more prominent
legitimating purpose for corporations, but social responsibility
has not entirely lost its legitimating role.
The very fact that discretion and power are highly
concentrated at the top of the corporate hierarchy concentrates
nonlegal as well as legal accountability there. Directors are said
to be "agents" of shareholders, but this agency is a metaphor, not
a proper doctrinal description. A true agent is subject to the
control of the principal, which is simply not true of the hierarchshareholder relationship.42 Despite the rhetoric of hierarchs'
"duty" to maximize profits, there is no actionable duty to do so.
The business judgment rule gives corporate hierarchs such wide
latitude in making business decisions that directors can never
honestly claim a legal obligation to make a specific morally
distasteful decision for the sake of the bottom line. Thus,
corporate hierarchs are not just "agents" of the allegedly profitminded shareholder principals; they are also autonomous moral
"agents."43
Unlike directors, however, shareholders
evade
39 See NEIL J. MITCHELL, THE GENEROUS CORPORATION: A POLITICAL
ANALYSIS
OF ECONOMIC POWER 6-7 (1989).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 56 (quoting Philip Shabecoff, Dow Stoops to
Calm Congress and Public
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1985, at B8).
42 See Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If
I Only Had a Heart: Or,
How Can We Identify a CorporateMorality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1666-67
(2002).
43 Cf. id. at 1650 ("[H]uman actors, rather than the corporation
itself, must be
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accountability almost completely. Any individual shareholder
can assure herself and her neighbors that she is simply powerless
44
to affect corporate conduct and thus bears no responsibility.
As noted above, the legal sanctions on directors are fairly
mild. But, as Melvin Eisenberg and others have pointed out,
they are augmented by nonlegal sanctions, such as the
disapprobation that accompanies the violation of social norms.
The legal sanctions for a breach of the duty of loyalty, for
Eisenberg
example, are normally limited to disgorgement.
breachers
because
penalty
low
inefficiently
an
argues that this is
face no risk of loss.
The social norm of loyalty, however, adds the sanction of loss of
reputation to the legal sanctions. Because the legal sanctions
are set at an inefficiently low level, the increase in sanctions
provided by the social norm is necessary if the total sanctions
for breach of the duty of loyalty are to approximate an efficient
level. 45
Elhauge points out that the business judgment rule's
deference to directors' decisions underscores their room to act
independently and morally, creating expectations that they do
so. 46 Thus, he argues, nonlegal sanctions are more likely to
induce socially responsible action from corporate hierarchs than
from shareholders. In the eyes of the public, corporate directors
and executive officers are a small, identifiable group, unlike the
The public
anonymous teeming masses of shareholders.
imagination has identified Bill Gates very closely with Microsoft,
Michael Eisner with Disney, and Rupert Murdoch with Fox and
its parent NewsCorp.4 7 And both the public and the hierarchs
morally accountable for the decisions and actions of a corporation."). Indeed,
Mitchell and Gabaldon argue that directors should be even further insulated from
accountability to shareholders-by longer terms of office or a specific "statutory
disclaimer" of the shareholder wealth maximization norm-in order to increase their
personal moral accountability for their decisions. Id. at 1668.
44 Here, I merely mean to show that shareholders can easily rationalize their
apathy and disclaim responsibility. I do not mean to address the thornier normative
question of whether such justifications are morally or ethically sound.
45 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1253, 1276 (1999).
46 See Elhauge, supra note 31, at 805-07. But cf. Mitchell & Gabaldon, supra
note 42, at 1663-64 (arguing that directors' morality is constrained by their role
within the corporation).
47 The media and the general public tend to focus on CEOs and Chairs, while
academics tend to focus on boards. For example, Stephen Bainbridge argues "to the
limited extent to which the corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is
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know that "corporate" decisions are made by the hierarchs as real
human beings, not by shareholders and not by some abstraction
known as "The Corporation." Therefore, at least relative to
shareholders, hierarchs are more likely to be targeted by and
responsive to public pressure and personal feelings of moral
responsibility.
The concentration of moral responsibility on managers
suggests that an expansion of shareholder decision-making
power would have the potential to backfire on a social justice
agenda.
It would increase the power of justice-minded
shareholder activists, but it would also empower profit-minded
shareholders. 48
Thus, it might lead to demands-legally
enforceable demands-for higher profits. Were that to occur, it
would relieve management from both the power and the socialmoral obligation to consider social justice.
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

What does the above analysis suggest for activists seeking
racial justice in corporate conduct?
A. Legal Sanctions
As noted above, the concentration of power in corporate
hierarchs creates an opportunity to incentivize socially beneficial
corporate behavior through individual legal sanctions. Because a
few individuals control corporate decision-making, there is some
potential to hold them legally responsible. As noted above, that
potential is limited, but there seems to be a desire in the postEnron era to impose greater individual liability on hierarchs for
corporate behavior. The high-profile civil suits and criminal
prosecutions against top executives in Enron, WorldCom,
HealthSouth, Tyco, and other corporations are the most obvious
examples. 49
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also reflects greater
personal accountability in its requirement that CEOs and CFOs
personally certify the accuracy of a corporation's financial
the board of directors that personifies the corporate entity." Bainbridge, supra note
3, at 560.
48 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 31, at 864 (noting that shareholders have
ability to limit managerial power).
49 See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, A Guilty Verdict: Other Cases; When the Top Seat
Is the Hot Seat, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at C1 (discussing examples of former
chief executives facing criminal charges).
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reporting, subject to criminal penalties for knowingly false
certifications. 50 However, it is too early to tell whether these
developments signify merely a passing fit of Enron-inspired
pique, or a real trend toward increased individual accountability
and liability.
The use of legal sanctions comes with a caveat, however. In
the current political climate, legal sanctions may sometimes have
a perverse effect. 5 1 Enron and related debacles notwithstanding,
many Americans seem to agree that businesses are the victims of
opportunistic litigants and plaintiffs' attorneys. This argument
helped propel the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, which subjected securities fraud lawsuits to numerous
procedural barriers, as well as the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, which moved class action lawsuits from state courts into
federal courts on the theory that plaintiffs and attorneys would
otherwise forum-shop for overly permissive class-action venues.
Thus, in at least some instances, a corporate defendant and the
public may attribute a complaint, and even an adverse judgment,
52
to greedy lawyers rather than a need for corporate reform.
B. Nonlegal Sanctions
The need for corporate legitimacy and the concentration of
accountability will contribute to corporate change only if activists
In certain situations and
apply constant public pressure.
rhetoric will be
anti-corporate
inflammatory
historical contexts,
But that
politicians.
useful to attract the support of populist
strategy is not usually welcomed. Even in the immediate postEnron atmosphere, the legal response was more reformist than
revolutionary. For the most part, activists should appeal to
individual directors' consciences and their desire for good
corporate and individual reputations. Activists should not focus
on the potential bottom-line benefits of racial reform. While
some corporate reforms, such as policing discriminatory conduct,
may improve profitability in some cases, this will not always be
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2005);
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 2005).
51 See James D. Cox, The Social Meaning of Shareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 3, 6 (1999).
52 Cf. id. at 5 (arguing that the deterrence power of shareholder litigation
depends on whether "shareholder litigation itself is viewed as a responsible actor" or
as a rent-seeking nuisance).
50
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the case. Moreover, justifying racial justice reform in bottom-line
terms implies that the value of racial justice depends on its effect
on share price. 53 In any case, corporate hierarchs are unlikely to
give much weight to activists' assertions about improved
profitability. After all, civil rights activists are not business
experts. They may squander political capital by posing as such.
They are more credible as a social and moral conscience than as
experts on effective business practices. Even where bottom-line
consequences are well-researched and documented, corporate
hierarchs are simply unlikely to welcome unsolicited outside
advice that encroaches on their area of control and presumptive
expertise.
In bringing nonlegal sanctions to bear on directors, it is
important to attribute actions to individual human beings.
Decisions are not made by "corporations" but by individual
human beings-directors and executive officers.
Thus the
rhetoric of corporate critique should criticize the moral choices of
specific individuals, not the robotic acts of a faceless
"corporation. '' 54 As noted above, corporate law gives
directors
and officers a great deal of autonomy to make corporate
decisions. The critique of individual hierarchs then should
squarely address and reject the mantra that "the shareholders
made me do it." 55 Indeed, rather than bemoaning the supposed
fact that the law imposes a "duty" to maximize shareholder
wealth, activists should recognize and advertise the absence of
such a duty-and demand that the resultant discretion be used
in a moral way.
Underscoring the legal autonomy of directors may improve
the morality of decision-making by requiring them to articulate
moral justifications to the public, as well as to one another:
[W]e now provide a psychological "out" for bad behavior.., by
53 See Joo, supra note 30, at 359.

54 Of course, tactics must be reasonably calculated to convince the public, and
not simply to castigate. Like litigation, singling out individuals may backfire if it is
perceived as harassing or unjustified. For example, members of People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) may have done their cause more harm than
good when they protested in front of the home of Petco's CEO based upon allegations
of animal mistreatment at Petco stores. The protestors-including one dressed in a
parrot costume-passed out fliers with the CEO's photo and the caption 'meet your
neighbor. Please let him know how you feel about the suffering and deaths of
countless animals in his Petco stores." Frank Green, PETA Takes Protest into Exec's
Home Turf, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 17, 2004, at C3.
55 See, e.g., Mitchell & Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1655.
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allowing managers to defend it on the grounds of profit
maximization. If they did not have this excuse, they would have
to supply their own reasons for bad behavior, and in our ideal
world, they would have to supply them publicly, although we
think that even the narrow process of having to justify it to each
boardroom and the executive suite would make a
other in the
56
difference.
I have of course exaggerated the dichotomy between
shareholder democracy and managerial hierarchy. For instance,
I point out that mechanisms of "corporate democracy"-especially
shareholder proposals-do not give shareholders the power to
cause change directly. I do not mean to argue that they are
useless. They may supplement the nonlegal sanctions on boards
Indeed,
by educating the public about corporate practices.
shareholder
nonbinding proposals, by publicly displaying
dissatisfaction, can be seen as a kind of nonlegal sanction. But
they operate as an appeal to hierarchs' power and consciences,
power. 57
not as a direct exercise of shareholder decision-making
Elhauge argues that managerial discretion combined with
nonlegal sanctions will "move corporate behavior in the right
direction, assuming our society's social and moral norms
58
The question, of
correctly identify which direction is right."
course, is whether our society's norms are "right." While I agree
that the hierarchical system makes nonlegal sanctions more
effective than they would be under diffuse shareholder control, I
do not share Elhauge's optimism that the result will be "right"that is, efficient for social utility as a whole. Racial justice
advocates must compete with other causes for scarce
management attention and corporate resources, just as, under
resources. 59
public choice theory, they must compete for public
Advocates for racial justice should see the hierarchical system as
creating an opportunity, if not a duty, constantly to pressure and
56

Id. at 1667.

57 Furthermore, nonbinding proposals on diversity matters may backfire. As

discussed above, the majority of shareholders are unlikely to value minority rights,

and even if they do, shareholders simply tend not to vote in large numbers. Thus a
proposal on a racial justice issue may receive a poor showing in an election, which
management may take as a sign that shareholders, and perhaps society in general,
do not value the issue.
58 Elhauge, supra note 31, at 107.
59 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 878 (1987) (describing the fundamentals of public choice
models of the legislative process).
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educate corporate hierarchs with respect to racial issues. One
way to view this role is to see racial justice advocates as potential
"norm entrepreneurs": 60 those who try to change
prevailing
boardroom norms to include norms of racial justice. 61 A more
cynical way of viewing the advocate's role is to assume that the
squeakiest activist wheels are likely to get the corporate greasethat is, that hierarchs respond to constituents' persistence,
rather than to an activist's agenda's relationship to social norms
or social utility.
C. Transparency
Cynthia Williams has argued that holding corporations
accountable for their impact on society requires greater
disclosure of their activities. 62
Hillary Sale and Robert
Thompson have argued that by requiring certain kinds of
disclosures, the SEC, in effect, regulates substantive
management conduct because inaction or inappropriate actions,
once disclosed, must be justified. 63 Through such rules, "the
Commission is regulating the conduct, not just what
management says about the conduct. Through disclosure can
come substance .... "64
Increased federal disclosure may also benefit racial justice
activists. SEC Regulation S-K sets forth specific items that
corporate management must disclose periodically. 65 Item 303,
known as "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations,"66 or "MD&A," requires
management to disclose events with potential to have a
60 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903,
929 (1996).
61 See id.
62 See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1294-96 (1999).
63 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872-73 (2003). For example, while federal
securities law does not directly regulate executive compensation, it arguably imposes
some limits on compensation by requiring detailed disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.404(a) (2005). Sale and Thompson argue that some SEC rules also effectively
impose a substantive duty of care. See Thompson & Sale, supra, at 873-74. For
example, Regulation S-K requires disclosure of known trends that may threaten
future liquidity, and to indicate how it proposes to respond. 17 C.F.R. §
2
29.303(a)(1).
64 Thompson & Sale, supra note 63, at 874.
65 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-.1123.
66 Id. § 229.303.
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"material" effect on corporate liquidity. 67 Item 103 requires
management to disclose "material" legal proceedings against the
corporation. 68 "Materiality" in these contexts seems to refer to
financial materiality. 69 Thus, for example, a number of small
employment discrimination lawsuits against a corporation might
70
Shareholder activists
escape the disclosure requirements.
of the meaning
expansion
an
for
SEC
the
might consider pressing
71
SEC rules
context,
In at least one other
of "materiality."
recognize that issues with only minimal financial significance
may still be relevant for securities regulation purposes on the
The SEC limits
basis of their social justice implications.
shareholders' right to put nonbinding proposals on the corporate
ballot. 72 To qualify for inclusion on the ballot, a shareholder
3
proposal must have "relevance;" 7 that is, it must relate to
operations accounting for at least five percent of the company's
assets or of its annual earnings or gross sales, or must be
"otherwise significantly related to the company's business." 74 A
federal court has held a proposal to be includable under the rule
"in light of the ethical and social significance of [the] proposal
'75 The
and the fact that it implicates significant levels of sales.
proposal had "ethical and social significance" in that it requested
a study to determine whether the production methods of one of
76 The
the corporation's suppliers involved cruelty to animals.
"significant levels of sales" implicated amounted to a mere
Id. § 229.303(a)(1).
Id. § 229.103.
69 Cf. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, at 45,151 &
n.5 (1999) (noting that non-financial concerns will not be addressed in the bulletin's
examination of materiality of errors in financial statements).
70 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 Instruction 2 (indicating that a lawsuit need not be
reported if it "does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the" company).
However, if there are pending or contemplated lawsuits based "in large degree [on]
the same legal and factual issues," the amounts involved in those proceedings should
"be included in computing such percentage." Id.
71 See Wade, supra note 1 at 911-13 (asking "whether the materiality
requirement undermines the accomplishment of true environmental justice").
Expanding disclosure, while likely to be an uphill battle, is probably the most
realistically achievable kind of reform in the near term.
72 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (listing rules for shareholder proposals).
73 See id. § 240.14a-8(i)(5).
67

68

74

Id.

75 Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 561 (D.D.C. 1985).
76 Id. at 556. The supplier provided the corporation with pdtg de foie gras, the
production of which traditionally involves the prolonged force-feeding of geese. Id. &
n.2.
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$79,000 out of $141 million in total revenues. 77
Lawrence Mitchell and Theresa Gabaldon suggest that
institutional reform may be able to increase individual moral
responsibility in the corporate setting:
"Demanding that
corporations disclose their decision-making processes, that
responsibility be clearly assigned within the organization, that
justifications for corporate acts be explicit and traceable to those
making the decisions, could go some way towards ensuring
greater
individual
accountability
and,
hence,
moral
78
responsibility."
The theory that individuals at the top of the corporate
hierarchy are subject to legal or nonlegal sanctions depends on
public knowledge of their individual conduct. This requires not
just disclosure of a corporation's record on racial issues, but
internal "paper trails" giving us a better understanding of the
role of the board and of individual board members and officers in
setting particular policies.
Boards should be required to keep more detailed meeting
minutes that show how individual directors voted on particular
issues, just as voters have access to the voting records of their
elected political representatives. 79 This proposal has practical
viability because it is consistent with the existing corporate law
principles:
shareholders are already able to access board
minutes and similar documents through their state-law right to
corporate books and records.80
Requiring corporations to
maintain more detailed and meaningful records would further
the purposes of this principle. Furthermore, such a reform would
increase director accountability for "pure" business decisions as
well as for "social" issues.

Shareholder

CONCLUSION
empowerment holds

little

potential

for

77 Id. at 558. That is, the corporation had sold only $79,000 of pft6 in the most
recent year. Id.
78 Mitchell & Gabaldon, supra note 42, at 1656.
79 See, e.g., Project Vote Smart, http://www.vote-smart.org (last visited Oct. 14,
2005) (providing, inter alia, comprehensive voting records of elected officials
nationwide).
so E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2001). The Delaware courts have
encouraged shareholder plaintiffs to exercise this right in order to craft specific
allegations in complaints against directors. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
266-67 (Del. 2000).
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Government
achieving racial justice in corporate conduct.
given the
particularly
solution,
intervention is also an unlikely
ideological tendencies of our current federal government.
Perhaps surprisingly, the existing system, which concentrates
power and discretion in the board of directors and executive
shareholder
than
potential
greater
holds
officers,
majoritarianism or government regulation. This is not to say
that corporate hierarchs have a more developed sense of moral
responsibility than lowly shareholders do. Nor does it mean that
the existing corporate governance system is an ideal method of
Indeed,
making corporations responsive to racial issues.
dependence on management discretion is probably the worst
possible method-except for all the others.
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